

## Soft Causatives in Spanish

Ricardo Maldonado

Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México

and

Universidad Autónoma de Querétaro

### I. Introduction

This paper addresses a descriptive problem that may have important implications for cognitive accounts of causative constructions. Causative constructions involve a variety of interaction types between a causer initiating the event and the causee actually acting or undergoing the event's action. These interactions determine the degree of integration of the two causal sub-vents into one. The descriptive problem involves providing an account for two causative constructions strongly linked to the speech event. One construction is of recent appearance but totally entrenched in Mexican Spanish (1) the other is well established in the dialect of Spain (2).

1. *Déja(me) veo si las tengo* Mexico  
let.IMP-OBJ1 see.1SG if them have.1SG  
'Let me see if I have it'
2. *Deja que veo si las tengo* Spain  
let.IMP COMP see.1SG if them have 1.SG  
'Let me see if I have it'

Since both constructions have a complement in indicative mood they will be identified as the (Mexican or Castillian) indicative causative constructions. Both constructions correspond to oral discourse and represent direct speaker-hearer interactions where the speaker holds her/his turn before responding to a previous request. If Valeria thinks that I may have her keys she can utter *¿Tienes mis llaves?* 'Do you have my keys?' examples (1) and (2) would be appropriate answers. There are important differences between the Mexican and the Castilian examples. In the former the causee *me* is the main clause object. There is no complementizer *que* between the two verbs and there is no intonation change or pause between the two clauses. At first sight it can be claimed that the main and the complement clause are fused into one simple clause. In contrast example (2) contains a complementizer *que* with a tone change (high-to-low) after the main verb *deja*.

More important is the fact that both constructions (1) and (2) always take indicative mood. In more canonical causatives the use of indicative is ruled out. As exemplified in (3), if the causee "raises" to object position in the main clause the subordinate verb takes infinitive. On the other hand if the causee is the subordinate subject the complementizer *que* must be used and the subordinate verb must take subjunctive mood as shown in (4):

3. *Déjame ver si las tengo*  
let-me see.INF if them have-1S  
'Let me see if I have it'

4. *Deja que vea si lo tengo*  
 let that see.SUBJ.1S if OBJ.3S have1S  
 ‘Allow that I see if I have it’

It is well known from cognitive and functional approaches that examples like (3) show a higher degree of event integration than (4) since the event is coded as one—although it is internally complex. The case of (4) is less integrated since a complex event is represented as composed of two subevents (Langacker 1991, Givon 1990, Kemmer & Verhagen 1994, Fauconnier and Turner 1996, 1998; Shibatani 2002). The question to address is whether integration is the right notion to account for the oral examples of Mexico and Spain. The use of the indicative form in both examples with and without complementizer argues against integration. It suggests an important degree of independence of the causee. This raises the question as to whether we can actually see the complement clause as subordinated to the main clause. In the body of this paper I will try to argue against an integrational analysis involving subordination and suggest that these constructions involve a high degree of subjectification (Langacker 2000). The causative verb *dejar* ‘let’ undergoes a strong process of attenuation to exhibit an equally high degree of transparency. Causation is thus reduced to its minimal expression and the asymmetry characteristic of subordination is not attested.

The paper is organized as follows. In section II introduces the view of causatives as determined by integrated conceptualizations. Section III offers the alternative view of causative events as varying according to degrees of complexity. Section IV constitutes the core of the paper. It is composed of two subsections. First the behavior of the indicative-causative construction is put forward. In section IV.I different degrees of (in)dependence pertaining Spanish causative constructions are shown and then in section IV.II the specific dependency problems of the indicative-causative construction are put forward. Here the semantic agentive attenuation process of *dejar* ‘let’ is given as the fundamental *raison d’être* of the construction. Also the degrees of independence of the three causative constructions in Spanish are seen then as clear manifestations of a subjectification process. Finally, Section V offers the conclusions.

## II. Event integration

As first proposed by Langacker (1991) and further developed by Kemmer & Verhagen (1994) complex analytic constructions may be seen as elaborations of basic schemas corresponding to a single predicate. According to that view constructions “...are best represented as schemas (of different degrees of specificity) some of which can be used as the basis for extension for the formation of more complex grammatical patterns” (Kemmer and Verhagen 1994: 145). Thus complex analyzable causatives can be seen as a schemas elaborated on the basis of a single predicate. (Kemmer & Verhagen 1994). Constructions with an intransitive complement clause are prototypically construed on the basis of a plain transitive verb: the causer is the nominative subject while the causee is the accusative direct object as in (5.) On the other hand, when the complement clause is transitive, the model of ditransitive verbs is assumed: the causee is most commonly a dative indirect object, while the third element remains the accusative object as in (6.).

5. I made Terry cry  
[S OD] < I ATE THE CAKE
6. I made John do it  
[S OI OD] < I GAVE HER THE CAKE

In line with that proposal, Fauconnier and Turner (1996, 1998) suggest that French causative constructions are best analyzed as conventional blends of two input spaces where the second space imports the roles and the syntax from a fully integrated event (the structure of a simple verb) in the first space. Causatives with *faire* “make” thus correspond to at least two mental representations the TRANSITIVE SCHEMA (Kemmer and Verhagen intransitive causative) and the TRANSFER SCHEMA (Kemmer and Verhagen transitive causative). As can be seen from example (7.), the causative construction with *faire* inherits its basic structure from the schema of an intransitive clause:

Transitive: Syntax: NP V NP  
Roles: CA E O

7. *Marie fait courir Paul, (Marie le fait courir)* < MARIE NOURRIT PAUL  
'Marie makes Paul run' ('Marie makes him run') 'Marie feeds Paul'

The syntax and the semantics of the transitive schema map on the periphrastic causal structure. The agent maps on the causer while the patient maps on the causee. All other mappings are predictable. Notice that the behavior of pronouns is predicted by the mappings: *le*, in brackets, is accusative. The dative clitic, *lui*, is nicely ruled out since there is no indirect object source. On the other hand, the transfer schema contains the structure of prototypical ditransitive verbs where there is an extra dative prepositional phrase [à NP]. The causative *faire* clause will follow the pattern of *donner* ‘give’ as in (8.). In contrast with (7.), the dative IO clitic *lui* is the event agent (EA), i.e. the causee in I2 as guaranteed by the basic transfer schema in I1:

Transfer: Syntax: NP V NP à NP  
Roles: CA E O IO

8. *Marie fait manger la soupe à Paul* < MARIE DONNE LA SOUP A PAUL  
'Marie make Paul eat his soup' 'Marie gives the soup to Paul'

*(Marie lui fait manger la soupe)*  
(‘Marie makes him eat his soup’)

The contrast between accusative and dative clitics in causative constructions is handled without using *ad hoc* mechanisms (transformations, union of clauses, promotions, etc.), as it simply corresponds to the properties if the source verb.

There are, however, a number of integration situations that do not correspond to the imposition of a simplex verb to a syntactic structure. For one thing, in French, the degree of integrations may depend on the position of the object causee. Achard (1996, 2000) has shown that the object (O), may occur either postverbally (VVO) or between the two verbs (VOV). The

variation is meaningful: the degree of influence of the mother's permission over Paul's action is stronger in the VV structure (9.b.) than in the VOV structure (9.a.):

9. a. *Sa mère laisse Paul jouer dans le jardin* (Achard 1996)  
 b. *Sa mère laisse jouer Paul dans le jardin*  
 'His mother lets Paul play in the garden'

We may suggest that in the VOV structure the nominal form is equated with a more agentive causee than in the VVO structure. Thus the degree of causee activity/agentivity determines degrees of integration.

A second problem for the integration model is the well-known variability between accusative and dative/instrumental marking on the causee in a wide variety of languages. Following a well-established tradition, Kemmer and Verhagen (1994) have referred to this phenomenon as the contrast between direct and indirect causation. The phenomenon, as they show, is crosslinguistically recurrent as seen in Hindi, German, Dutch, Kannada and many other languages. Spanish is no exception to this general tendency, as can be seen from the accusative/dative alternation in (10) and (11):

10. *Lo hizo salir*  
 acc made.3sg go out  
 'He made him go out'

11. *Le hizo salir*  
 dat made.3sg go out  
 'He made him go out'

Consistent with crosslinguistic patterns, the use of the accusative clitic implies stronger causation and control by the causer. The dative form on the other hand designates a case where the causee leaves the room by his own initiative and will as convinced or invited by the causer. Shibatani (2002) has suggested that direct causation corresponds to cases where the causee is equated with the patient while indirect causation the causee is an agent. Leaving aside Spanish<sup>1</sup> dialectal differences, the dative clitic designates that the subject of the complement clause, the causee, is more independent and thus, is less controlled by the causer. Datives generally mark some type of distance either from the subject or from the action designated by the verb. One manifestation of that in Mexican Spanish and many Latin American countries is the use of dative *le* to address older people or people with a higher social status. Comrie (1976) has pointed out a common contrast between dative and instrumental marking on the causee which Kemmer and Verhagen (1994) see as depending on the degree of integration and affectedness of the causee. They rightly sustain that instrumental marking is consistently less integrated than the dative. These cases correspond to an initiative capacity hierarchy **agent** > **experiencer** > **other** which is by default encoded by nominative > dative and other (accusative or oblique) as initially proposed by Givon

---

<sup>1</sup> Facts involve a considerable amount of variation with subtle meanings. In the standard dialect of Spain *le* and *la* lost their case meaning (dative and accusative) and became gender markers: masculine *le*, feminine *la*. The problem is complicated by the fact that there are *leísta*, *loísta* and *laísta* dialects that choose *le*, *lo* or *la* as the unmarked clitic for accusative meanings. While in Spain there is strong *leísmo*, the Latin American dialects have kept to a considerable extent the original case meanings inherited from Latin: dative for *le* and accusative for *lo*, *la*.

(1990) and Langacker (1991). Thus accusative causees mark direct causation while instrumental causees correspond to indirect causation. Yet for many languages the instrumental case may overrule dative and accusative marking. In the case of Quechua instrumental overrules accusative as exemplified in (12 and 13, from Langacker 1991):

12. *nuqa fan-ta rumi-ta apa-či-ni*  
 I Juan-acc rock-acc c arry-caus-I  
 ‘I made Juan carry the rock’

13. *nuqa fan-wan rumi-ta apa-či-ni*  
 I Juan-instr rock-acc carry-caus-I  
 ‘I had Juan carry the rock’

and Kannada exemplifies a case where instrumental dominates dative (from Langacker 1991):

14. *avanu nanage bisketannu tinnisidanu*  
 he:nom me:dat biscuit:acc eat:caus:past  
 ‘He fed me a biscuit’

15. *avanu nanninda bisketannu tinnisidanu*  
 he:nom me:instr biscuit:acc eat:caus:past  
 ‘He caused me to eat a biscuit’

Langacker explains that in these languages the instrumental inherits the active/agentive properties from the agent. Thus the initiation hierarchy would be agent > instrument > dative > accusative > other. There seems to be abundant data showing that in causation the degree of activity of the causee is crucial in determining the degree of causation imposed by the causer. In the next section I explore the ways in which this property determines event complexity.

### III. Causal Event Complexity

From a variety of perspectives (Shibatani 2002, Givon 1990, Comrie 1976, Maldonado & Nava 2002, Vázquez 2002) it has been claimed that causative constructions are determined by the complexity of the event. Complexity is determined by the several of factors: the number of participants involved in the event, the degree of (in)dependence of the causee to perform an action, the degree of volition with which the causer impinges the causee to do something, the capacity of the causee to resist the causer’s input and the degree of separability of the two composing subevents. All these facts are best understood in terms of force-dynamics (FD). FD has proven crucial for a variety of causation, modality and speaker’s expectations phenomena (Langacker 1991, Maldonado 1987, 1999). It involves the encounter of two forces for which the stronger determines the output of the event. Figures 3 and 4 represent two polar FD situations. In Figure 3 the left-to-right arrow with the ‘+’ sign is the stronger force overwhelming a resisting force (the right-to-left arrow). The change of state (the arrow outside the dotted rectangle) results from the dominance of the acting force. Figure 4 provides the opposite construal where the resisting force is stronger and blocks the action, as indicated by the dot on the arrow.



Figure 1. Force dynamics stronger acting force



Figure 2. Force dynamics stronger resisting force

Causal constructions conform to a basic FD representation. The causer imposes force on the causee for it to undergo some change of state. Force dynamics is lexicalized in the meaning of the causal verb. Thus in the Spanish version of Talmy's classical examples *seguir* 'keep' (Figure 3) and *dejar* 'cease' (Figure 4) two opposite FD structures can contrast as shown (16.):

16. a. *La pelota siguió rodando sobre la dura hierba*  
 'The ball kept rolling against the stiff grass'  
 b. *La pelota dejó de rodar por la dureza de la hierba*  
 'The ball stop rolling due to the stiffness of the grass'

In *seguir* (Figure 3) the initial force is stronger than the resisting grass thus the ball's rolling continues. *Dejar*, as represented in Figure 4, has the opposite FD structure: the stronger resisting force blocks the motion pattern as indicated by the dot on the line.

The strength being profiled by the causative verb varies importantly in degree. Thus *forzar* 'force' and *hacer* 'make' contrast in the degree of strength necessary to bring about the causal event. The higher degree of energy depicted by *forzar* involves a higher degree of the causee's resistance. As I will show below the new construction is only possible with a low degree of energy input.

Talmy's force-dynamics and Shibatani's (2002) definition of direct and indirect causation coincide: direct causation implies an agent causer and a patient causee, while indirect causation is a case where both causer and causee are agentive and the degree of energy conflict is higher. Given these definitions we may link the degree of complexity of the causal event with the type of coding. Lexical causatives *matar* 'kill', *romper* 'break', *doblar* 'bend', etc. correspond to direct causation. An outstanding property of lexical causatives is that the initiative causal event and the actual action are not separable. On the other hand analytic causatives do designate two subevents with different degrees of integration/separateness. Thus they may depict either direct or indirect events. Now there are many languages that do not have a vast number of lexical causatives. For those languages direct causation is obtained with causative morphology. Tarascan, or P'orepecha, as called by its speakers, constitutes an example where a gradual increase of morphemic and periphrastic complexity can be found (Maldonado and Nava 2002). In the simplest case an intransitive stem (17.a) can take the *-ra* causative suffix to obtain a direct causative construction (17.b):

17. a. *Takusi ura-pi-s-Ø-ti*  
 cloth white-INTR-PERF-PRES-IND.3  
 'The cloth is white'  
 b. *Valeria ura-pe-ra-s-Ø-ti takusi-ni*  
 Valeria white-INTR-CAUS-PRES-IND.3 cloth-NS  
 'Valeria (painted/washed) the cloth white'

We may expect indirect causation to be marked with a causative verb in an analytic construction. While this happens under specific circumstances, depending on the degree of complexity of the event, indirect causation may be marked by more than one causative morpheme. In (18) *-tara* makes the direct causative event an indirect one:

18. *Valeria ura-pe-ra-tara-s-Ø-ti takusi-ni Adrián-ni*  
 Valeria white-INTR-CAUS-CAUS-PRES-IND.3 cloth-NS Adrián-NS  
 ‘Valeria made Adrian whiten the cloth’

In the absence of *-ra* the use of *-tara* is out (\**Valeria ura-pe--tara-s-Ø-ti takusi-ni Adrián-ni*). A direct causative construal is required as the basis for an indirect one to take place. This reflects the higher degree of complexity of indirect causation. Although the *-tara* indirect construction already involves an agentive causee Adrian in (18) is still compelled to perform the action imposed by the Valeria. Should the causee need to be represented with a higher degree of independence the construction would have to be periphrastic, as in (19), where the causative verb *uni* ‘make’ designates the causing event while *horni* ‘learn’ designates the performed action. The complex event is composed now of two sub-events with higher degree of independence.

19. *Ji u-sin-0-ka eski-ksi sapi-icha hore-n-kurhi-a-ka*  
 I make-HAB-PRES-IND1/2 COMP-PL3 child-PL know-?-RFLX-FUT-SUBJ  
 ‘I make the child know’ (I teach the child)

Moreover, the interaction among participants may be coded in finer terms to designate different degrees of implicativity. While in morphological causatives the causal event must happen, in periphrastic ones the forcer dynamic quality of the verb determines whether the causal event must take place. The verb *uni* ‘make’ in (19) is considerably more applicative than *jurani* ‘let’. In (20) Maria’s daughter may have not gone to the party:

20. *Maria jura-hku-s-Ø-ti wahpa-ni para nira-ni k’winchikwa-rho*  
 María let-CAUS-PERF-PRES-IND.3 kin-ACC para go-INF party-LOC  
 ‘María let her daughter go to the party’

Lexical differences in implicativity are crosslinguistically common. Spanish *forzar* ‘force’, *hacer* ‘make’ and *dejar* ‘let’ provide a downward cline causal imposition by the causer which runs in the opposite direction of the activity degree of the causee:

21. *Lo forzó a salir del salón*  
 ‘He forced him to leave the room’
22. *Lo hizo salir del salón*  
 ‘He made him leave the room’
23. *Lo dejó salir del salón*  
 ‘He let him leave the room’

The P’orepecha data suggest a gradual increase in causal complexity by which, in the simplest case, lexical causatives code direct causation construals designating causer/causee contact with high degree of implicativity. Morphemic causatives may either code direct or indirect causation. Indirect causatives are more complex and less implicative. Both P’orepecha and Spanish attest for indirect causation as involving a gradual decrease of implicativity mostly determined by the degree of independence/agentivity of the causee and by the possibility of construing the causative

event as composed of two independent events. The iconic match of implicativity directness and degree of complexity in coding is represented in Figure 3:




Figure 3. Causal event complexity

Given this gradual organization we may expect that languages will chose alternative coding strategies to reflect the degree of complexity involved in the interaction between causer and causee. Event conflation, a phenomenon where a simple verb imposes its structure on the causative construction undoubtedly exists. It corresponds to construals that approximate direct causation construals. However we expect higher degree of independence to be coded periphrastically. Higher degrees of implicativity will tend to align to the left of figure 5. On the other hand causative construals involving a somewhat direct type of interaction align to the right side of the scale. In the case of Spanish it will be shown that constructions with infinitival complements are more implicative than those with a complementizer. Moreover I will show that the Mexico and Spain oral causative constructions in (1) and (2) show the highest degree of causal independence. I will first describe the properties of the indicative causative construction to then explain how it relates to other causative constructions in Spanish.

#### IV. The Indicative-causative Construction

The indicative-causative construction in Castilian Spanish is well established in oral discourse. We may see from example (24) that it depicts two semi-independent events:

24. *Deja, que yo lo limpio*  
 let COMP I it clean  
 ‘Stop, I’ll do it’

The two events can easily be recognized. There is a strong pause to control on the one hand the hearer’s behavior and, on the other, to introduce the speaker’s action. The complementizer can be omitted. However the pause and the intonation change are clear enough to distinguish the two subevents:

25. *Deja, yo lo limpio*  
 let I it clean  
 ‘Stop, I’ll do it’

The pause can be reduced and the subject pronoun can be left out to signal a less stringent subevent separation:

26. *Deja que lo limpio*  
 let COMP it clean  
 ‘Stop, I’ll do it’

Yet in all cases the instruction for the hearer to wait while the speaker performs some action is constant. The indicative form iconically represents a high degree of causee independence and control. The causee is active and agentive and the main clause subject shows no causative strength. This subdivision for the Mexican construction is not as clear. However some restrictions attest for a non-intregational analysis. Let us revise some restrictions for both dialects as well as those that are specific for Mexican Spanish.

There are shared restrictions both for the Mexican and the Castilian construction. Since it is a request it can only be coded as imperative mood. Declarative (27.a-b) and indirect requests expressed in subordinate clauses (27.c) are out. In all cases the first example corresponds to Castilian and the second to Mexican Spanish:

27. a. \* *Dejas que veo si puedo ir*  
 \* *Dejas veo si puedo ir*  
 ‘You let I see if I can go’  
 b. \* *Mi padre me deja que lo busco*  
 \* *Mi padre me deja lo busco*  
 ‘Mi father lets me I search fir it’  
 c. \* *Espero que dejes veo si puedo ir*  
 \* *Espero que dejes veo si puedo ir*  
 ‘I hope that you let I see if I can go’

In both varieties the indicative-causative construction involves a polite command from speaker to hearer to hold while s/he does some other action. Thus the causee may only be expressed in first person as in (28.a). The plural first person is also possible while not pragmatically common (28.b) and all other grammatical persons are questionable as in (28.c-d):

28. a. *Deja veo si puedo ir*  
 let-2S see-1S if can-1S go  
 ‘Let me see if I can go’  
 b. % *Deja vemos si podemos ir*  
 let-2S see-1PL if can-1PL go  
 ‘Let us see if we can go’  
 c. \* *Deja ve si puede ir*  
 let-2S see-3S if can-3S go  
 ‘Let him see if he can go’  
 d. \* *Deja ven si pueden ir*  
 let-2S see-3PL if can-3PL go  
 ‘Let him see if he can go’

Further restrictions determined by face to face Speaker-Hearer interaction show that the causal verb can only be used in second person singular or plural as in (29.). Verb inflection for third and first person on LET are ruled out:

29. a. *Deja veo si puedo ir*  
let-2S see-1S if can-1S go  
'Let me see if I can go'  
b. *Dejen veo si puedo ir*  
let-2PL see-1S if can-1S go  
'Let me see if I can go'
30. a. \* *Deja(n) veo si puedo ir*  
let-3S see-1S if can-1S go  
'He/they let me see if I can go'  
b. \* *Dejo veo si puedo ir*  
let-1S see-1S if can-1S go  
'I let me see if I can go'

The Mexican Spanish construction may be more problematic than the Castilian counterpart and shows further restrictions. The indicative causative construction is most commonly used informally but the respectful second person form is also allowed (31.b). Notice however that the subject pronoun representing the causee is illegal (31.c, d).

31. a. *Deja lo busco*  
'Let-INFORM that I look for it'  
b. *Deje lo busco*  
'Let-FORM that I look for it'  
c. \* *Deja tú lo busco*  
'You let that I look for it'  
d. \* *Deje usted lo busco*  
'You-FORMAL let that I look for it'

These restrictions do not apply to Castilian Spanish:

32. a. *Deja tú que lo busco*  
'You let that I look for it'  
b. *Deje usted que lo busco*  
'You-FORMAL let that I look for it'

Interestingly enough the pronoun can be used for emphatic purposes in the subjunctive-causative construction in both varieties of Spanish, as shown in (33.a-b):

33. a. *Deja tú que lo busque*  
'You let that I look for it'  
b. *Deje usted que lo busque*  
'You-FORMAL let that I look for it'

It must be stressed that in all cases that the causee is always identified with the speaker. Should the causee be someone the reader equates with a more interactive causative reading. In (34) the subject of LET actually allows the causee to act and none of the restrictions apply. Any person for causer and causee are legal as long as they do not co-refer :

34. *Dejo/as/a que tú/él/ellos lo busque/s//n*  
 let.1/2/3 COMP he/them it search/1//2/3S/3PL  
 ‘Let them search for it’

The use restrictions found particularly in the Mexican Spanish indicative construction show an outstanding rigidity which resembles the behavior of idiomatic constructions. One may be tempted to analyze the INDICATIVE-CAUSATIVE as a “construction” a la Goldberg. This would be a wrong step. For one thing idiomatic constructions are the result of fossilized use reflecting frequent use and natural association of components. Its degree of lexicalization normally resists a compositional analysis of its meaning. The INDICATIVE-CAUSATIVE responds to the opposite characterization. It is a new construction emerging in a specific speech act situation, the construction meaning is fully compositional and it has only started to expand to new verbs that match the basic structure of the causative verb LET. Moreover, as I will show in the following section the degree of independence of the two sub-events of the INDICATIVE-CAUSATIVE construction is strictly determined by the polysemy of LET which in fact develops to a more transparent interpretation.

#### *IV.1 Causal event independence*

The degree of causative strength may be determined by the lexical properties of the causative verb. Thus *forzar* ‘force’ ranks above the scale strength over *hacer* ‘make’ and *dejar* ‘let’. Yet it is also the case that the coding patterns are meaningful enough to reflect the degree autonomy/dependence among causative sub-events.

In Spanish, the SUBJUNCTIVE-CAUSATIVE construction contrasts with the INFINITIVE-CAUSATIVE in that the causee is more independent from the causer’s imposition. This is evidenced by the fact that the causee is freer to take action in a variety of situations. Suppose the causer is physically holding the causee to prevent him from hitting his enemy, then only (35.b) is adequate. In (35.a) the implication is that the causee may take action but he is not in trends of doing so:

35. a. *Deja que le parta la cara*  
 ‘Let that I smash his face’ (Lit: ‘let me split his face’)  
 b. *Déjame partirle la cara*  
 ‘Let me smash his face’

Likewise if somebody is intentionally blocking my way as I try to leave the room I will utter *déjame salir* ‘Let me out’. The SUBJUNCTIVE-CAUSATIVE construction *deja que salga* corresponds to less stringent situations.

Moreover, if George Lakoff keeps interrupting my talk I will say to George *Déjame hablar* ‘Let me speak’, not ?? *Deja que hable* ‘let that I speak’.

An iconic syntactic manifestation of the degree of conflation of the two subevents in the INFINITIVE-CAUSATIVE construction is the fact that the causee must occur as the main clause object, failing to do so leads to a marginal output as in (36.b).<sup>2</sup>

36. a. *Déjame buscarla*  
 'Let me look for her'  
 b. ?? *Deja buscarla*  
 'Let look for her'

Needles to say, if the causee is third person the sentence is ill formed. The case of (36.b) is still valid since the causee is identified with the speaker and he is recoverable from the immediate context, a situation not applicable to third person in (37.b) which leads to an ungrammatical output:

37. a. *Déjalo buscarla*  
 'Let him look for her'  
 b. \* *Deja buscarla*  
 'Let look for her'

Another fact showing a high degree of integration is the requirement to for self-inductive middle verbs to only take the INFINITIVE-CAUSATIVE construction, as evidenced by the ungrammaticality of the (b.) sentences (for a full account of self agentive causative see García Miguel, this volume):

38. a. *La señora se dejó caer para llamar la atención*  
 'The lady let herself fall to attract attention'  
 b. \* *La señora deja<sub>i</sub> que se caiga<sub>i</sub> para llamar la atención*
39. a. *Si me deajo caer me puedo lastimar*  
 'If I let myself fall I can hurt myself'  
 b. \* *Si deajo<sub>i</sub> que me caiga<sub>i</sub> me puedo lastimar*  
 'If I let that I fall, I can hurt myself'

Physical or temporal proximity is iconically encoded by the INFINITIVE-CAUSATIVE construction. Thus the SUBJUNCTIVE-CAUSATIVE construction is best to express future events, such as a hitting an aberrant enemy and the INFINITIVE-CAUSATIVE is awkward since it implies immediateness as in (40.b):

40. a. *De que lo vea y le parto la cara* (future event)  
 'Let that I see him and I will smash his face'

---

<sup>2</sup> This is a transitivity related issue. Things are worse if the complement clause is transitive and less marginal with intransitive non-active subjects:

1. a. *Déjame descansar*  
 'Let me rest'  
 b. % *Deja descansar*  
 'Let rest'

- b. ?? *Déjame verlo y le parto la cara* (future event)  
 ‘Let me see him and I will smash his face’

In parallel fashion a predictive situation is best encoded by the SUBJUNCTIVE-CAUSATIVE. The case of (41) is important because, in the predictive reading, the caused action is totally independent from the causer’s restrictions. Here the meaning brings a strong inference of WAITING, a meaning that the INDICATIVE-CAUSATIVE construction has grammaticized:

41. *Deja que Juan salga de estos problemas y verás que bello será todo*  
 ‘Let [wait] Juan get out of these problems and you’ll see how beautiful everything will be’

As may be expected the INF-CAUS construction \**Déja a Juan salir del problema...* ‘Let Juan get out of the problem’, \**Déjalo salir del problema...* ‘Let him get out of the problem...’ is inadequate given its degree of temporal immediateness. The infinitive construction designates that the hearer is actually blocking *Juan* to solve the problem.

#### IV.2 . Causal Independence and the INDICATIVE-CAUSATIVE construction

The degree of event conflation of the INDICATIVE-CAUSATIVE increases if the causee occurs as the object of the main clause. As can be seen from (42) the “raised” subject to object position constitutes an argument for event conflation, i.e., for a high degree of event integration:

42. *Déjame lo busco*  
 let-me it search-1S-IND  
 ‘Let me look for it’

Adverbial modifiers provide a natural argument for degree of integration. Notice that the subjunctive causative construction allows a prepositional phrase between the two clauses (43.a). In colloquial Mexican Spanish it is also possible for the causee to “raise” as the main clause object still taking the prepositional phrase, as can be seen from (43.b). However when the causee is the object of the main clause the inserted prepositional phrase leads to an ungrammatical construction as in (43.c):

43. a. *Deja que, con paciencia, lo busque*  
 let that, with patience, it look for-1S.SUBJ  
 b. *Déjame que, con paciencia, lo busque*  
 let-me that, with patience, it look for-1S.SUBJ  
 c. \**Déjame, con paciencia, lo busco*  
 let-me, with patience, it look for-1S.IND  
 ‘Let me look for it patiently’

From these data we may conclude that in the INDICATIVE-CAUSATIVE constructions the two sub-events are more integrated than in the SUBJUNCTIVE-CAUSATIVE construction. This observation is corroborated by the fact that the caused event may be coordinated in the INDICATIVE-CAUSATIVE construction (44.a.) and under those circumstances the prepositional phrase can be inserted (44.b):

44. a. *Deja y lo busco*  
 ‘Let and I look for it’  
 b. *Deja y con paciencia lo busco*  
 ‘Let and with patience I look for it’

Interestingly enough under coordination the causee may also occur as object in the main clause, as in (45.):

45. *Déjame y con paciencia lo busco*  
 ‘Let me and with patience I look for it’

Moreover the causee may be expressed overtly as subject of the caused clause (46.), while the causer may not, as already shown in (31.c) and repeated here for convenience as (46.b):

46. a. *Deja yo lo busco*  
 ‘Let I look for it’  
 b. \* *Deja tú lo busco*  
 ‘You let that I look for it’

Crucially it is also possible to have the causee doubly marked as object in the main clause and as subject of the coordinated clause:

47. *Déjame y con paciencia yo lo busco*  
 ‘Let me and with patience I look for it’

What these data suggest is that the INDICATIVE-CAUSATIVE construction conforms to an intermediate degree of dependence and integration. The now soft imposition of the causer over the causee and the appearance of causee as the main clause object, allege for a high degree of event conflation. However the indicative mood on the complement caused clause, the possibility of coordinating the two clauses, the flexibility to have an overt causee subject pronoun and the possibility of inserting a prepositional adverbial phrase between the two clauses argues in favor an analysis in terms of independence.

Of special interest is the fact that the formal behavior reflects the degree of event complexity at the conceptual level. While there is some degree of dependence in the construction it fails to encode any situation approaching direct causation. Coercive causation with physical contact is banned for the INDICATIVE-CAUSATIVE construction, only the subjunctive is legal:

48. a. *Déjame partirle la cara*  
 ‘Let me smash his face’  
 b. \* *Déjame le parto la cara*

Direct interference in the causee’s action is also prohibited for the INDICATIVE-CAUSATIVE construction. Notice from (49.a-b) that the infinitive and the subjunctive construction are legal while the indicative is not (49.c):

49. a. *No me interrumpas, deja que termine la tarea* SUBJ-CAUS  
 b. *No me interrumpas, déjame terminar* INF-CAUS  
 c. \* *No me interrumpas, déja(me) termino la tarea* IND-CAUS  
 ‘Don’t interrupt me let me finish my homework’

The low degree of causer input over the causee predicts that strong causal verbs are not legal for this construction. This is attested by the impossibility of using *hacer* ‘make’ and *forzar* ‘force’

50. a. \* *Hazme lo busco*  
 make-me it I look for  
 b. \* *Fuérzame lo busco*  
 force-me it I look for

Further evidence that the causer strength on the causee is almost null can be seen from the fact that even verbs of permission such as *autorizar* ‘authorize’ and *delegar* ‘delegate’ are not allowed for the INDICATIVE-CAUSATIVE construction:

51. a. *Déjame lo limpio*  
 ‘Let me clean it’  
 b. \* *Autorízame lo limpio*  
 ‘Authorize me to clean it’  
 c. \* *Delégame lo limpio*  
 ‘Delegate me to clean it’

Only, *permitir* ‘permit’ may be accepted by some speakers only with the polite meaning of English ‘allow’ as when the speaker offers to help the hearer in doing something (*Allow me, I will do it for you*):

52. % *Permíteme lo limpio*  
 ‘Allow me, I’ll clean it’

The exclusion of strong and weak causative verbs and the restriction of using the “polite” meaning of *permitir* suggests that the meaning of *dejar* in the construction has been bleached from the permissive causative to a more generic meaning of ‘WAITING’ by which the speaker requires the hearer to hold, to remain in the line of communication while s/he performs another action. The INDICATIVE-CAUSATIVE construction (53.a.) is the grammaticized version of *esperar* in the SUBJUNCTIVE-CAUSATIVE construction in (53.b.):

53. a. *Deja lo busco*  
 Let it look-1S  
 b. *Espera a que lo busque*  
 ‘Wait for me to look for it’

In fact the INDICATIVE-CAUSATIVE construction may be linked via metonymy with the coordinate *esperar* construction: *Espérame y te ayudo* ‘Wait for me and I’ll help you’, *espérame y nos vamos* ‘wait for me and we’ll go’ which seems to respond to similar communicative needs of holding

speaker/hearer contact while some other action is being performed. The construction may be also primed by the use of *permitir* ‘allow’ which in polite conversation means ‘wait’:

54. - *¿Puedo hablar con la doctora Poot?* ‘Can I talk to Dr. Poot?’  
 - *Por supuesto, permítame* ‘Of course, allow me = wait’

Yet the bleaching process of the causative LET meaning is mostly favored by the verb root meaning. *Dejar* in the CAUS-IND construction simply develops from its historical root meaning ‘to leave something in some place as in (55.a) and more schematically ‘to suspend having contact with some object’ as in (55.b-c):

55. a. *¿Dónde dejé la bolsa?*  
 ‘Where did I leave my bag’  
 b. *Deberías dejar esos asuntos*  
 ‘You should leave those issues’  
 c. *El mar de las noches deja un rumor relajante*  
 ‘The sea at night leaves a relaxing rumor’

Soarez da Silva’s extensive study of *deixar* ‘LET’ in Portuguese (1999, in press) shows that the causative use of *deixar* most probably develops from the basic meaning of *deixar* which in schematic terms means “to suspend interaction with what is characterized as static” The examples in (55.a-c) conform to that characterization. As for the causative values of *deixar* Soarez da Silva provides the following schematic representation: ‘not to oppose what is presented as dynamic’. This is in fact actualized in three more specific meanings which fully coincide with the English causative *let* and with the Spanish *dejar*: This can be observed in (56. i) ‘allow’, ii) ‘let go’, iii) ‘not to prevent’. I have added the Spanish gloss to show the parallelism between Portuguese and Spanish:

56. i. *Ele deixou o pássaro voar (abindo a gaiola)* LET GO  
 Ella dejó volar el pájaro (abriendo la jaula)  
 ‘She let the bird fly out (by opening the cage)’  
 ii. *A Maria pediu-me para ir ao cinema, e eu deixei-a ir* ALLOW  
 María me pidió permiso de ir al cine, y yo la dejé ir  
 ‘María asked me if she could go to the cinema and I let her go’  
 iii. *O João pôs-se fazer disparates, e eudeixei-o fazer* NOT TO PREVENT, NOT TO IMPEDE  
 Juan empezó a hacer disparates y yo lo dejé hacerlos  
 ‘John started fooling around and I let him do it’

The evolution from the root meaning to the causative is determined by the fact that the object of interaction is dynamic in the causative construction and non-dynamic in the root meaning (Soarez da Silva in press). Now the range of meanings found in the causative constructions seems to follow a well attested and transparent pattern of extension: from the concrete the LET GO FD interaction where the causer stops blocking the bird’s action. That schema takes an abstract configuration in the ALLOW meaning such that the hands can now be equated with the authority in blocking someone’s action in an asymmetric relationship. It is now well established that changes from the concrete dominion to an abstract one involve a weakening and a bleaching process. The loss of actual strength evidences as the actual controlling force is canceled to let the bird fly in

(56.i) while in (56.ii) the potential of using such blocking force is not exerted and in fact a positive force of approval goes along with the action. A further step in this weakening process is exemplified in (56.iii). Not preventing constitutes an event where the causer, more than flowing with the causee's action simply refrains from exerting his blocking force.

These three levels of lessened participation constitute the basis for the proper understanding of the INDICATIVE-CAUSATIVE construction as it constitutes a further step in the causation weakening process of LET. The construction meaning develops from (56.iii). The meaning change from 'NOT PREVENTING' to 'WAITING' is expected since 'REFRAINING FROM ACTING FOR SOME TIME' is a strong inference of 'NOT PREVENTING': the causer requests the causee to hold his/her potential acting capacity thus the time span gains prominence and the actual causal force keeps bleaching out.

The lessened degree of causal force has already been pointed out as a lexical property of causal verbs. The down cline from *forzar* 'force' > *hacer* 'make' > *permitir* 'permit' > *dejar* 'let' is well attested in innumerable languages of the world. Now syntactic constructions obey finer communicative needs. For one thing lexical forms do not designate if causation lessens due to the stronger or weaker resistance of the causee or to the increased/diminished strength of the causer. Causative constructions do respond to those finer demands. Syntactic composition matches the degree of complexity of the event. Independent of the level of causal strength of the verb the causative construction reflects different degrees of causer/causee independence as evidenced by the parallel behavior of *hacer* and *dejar*, in the INFINITIVE-CAUSATIVE, the SUBJUNCTIVE-CAUSATIVE and the INDICATIVE-CAUSATIVE constructions:

57. a. *Antonio me hizo salir*  
'Antonio made me leave/go out'
- b. *Antonio hizo que saliera*  
'Antonio made that I leave/go out'
- c. \* *Hazme salgo (y nos vamos)*  
make-me I leave/go out
58. a. *Antonio me dejó salir*  
'Antonio let me leave/go out'
- b. *Antonio dejó que saliera*  
Antonio let that I leave/go out'
- c. *Déjame salgo (y nos vamos)*  
'Let me go out = 'Wait and I come out (and we will go)'

Only *dejar* and not *hacer* takes the indicative causative construal. Langacker (1991) has defined causatives as constructions where the causer has the capacity of initiating the caused event. I claim that the independence of the causee increases as we move down from the INFINITIVE-CAUSATIVE to the SUBJUNCTIVE-CAUSATIVE to the INDICATIVE-CAUSATIVE. One reason for event independence is found in the resistance on the causee's part to the causers input, yet the decreasing "directness" of the three Spanish causative constructions obtains as the degree of participation of the causer diminishes to its minimal manifestation: waiting.

Event independence is determined by the degree of interactive strength established between causer and causee as provided by both the construction and the causative verb. Focusing on the causative constructions we see that they code three different force-dynamic schemas. As a working hypothesis, let us assume a three-way gradual organization of causal energy (E):

59. Causal energy:  $E+ > E > E-$ 

The contrast between direct and indirect causatives implies only two levels, yet there are languages that clearly code a three way distinction, Dutch being a well documented example in case marking.<sup>3</sup>

As for the Spanish causative constructions we can see that event independence is equated with an energy decrease on the causer's part. Within the lexical limits of the verb *dejar*, in the INFINITIVE-CAUSATIVE construction the causer is maximally energetic [ $E+$ ]; in the SUBJUNCTIVE-CAUSATIVE s/he is energy neutral [ $E$ ] while in the INDICATIVE-CAUSATIVE construction the causer is non-energetic [ $E-$ ]. As for the causee some energy adjustments may take place as determined by the strength of the causer. This is the case of the INFINITIVE-CAUSATIVE and the SUBJUNCTIVE-CAUSATIVE constructions. Yet the causee may also have its own energy configuration in the construction. One obvious case is the INDICATIVE-CAUSATIVE where the indicative mood on the verb makes the causee take higher energy [ $E+$ ]. We can schematically represent this three way contrast in the following manner:




Fig. 4. INF-CAUS




Fig. 5. SUBJ-CAUS




Fig. 6. IND-CAUS

In Figure 4 the infinitive-causative construction reflects higher degrees of integration. The causee integrates to the main clause as the main clause object. The caused event is impinged by the causer who is energetic [ $E+$ ]. In Figure 5 the subjunctive-causative construction is less integrated. The independence of caused event is attested by the fact that the causee remains as the subject of the complement clause. The two events remain relatively independent and the causer holds an intermediate degree of energy [ $E$ ]. In this case for the causal event to happen the causee's participation is necessary. Thus the initiative force is less stringent. This is represented as an attenuation of agentivity which matches the trends of subjectivity (see below). As for Figure 6 the caused event is not determined by the causer's action at all [ $E-$ ]. We may suggest that such initial strength has become almost totally transparent. The causee is clearly energetic [ $E+$ ], as coded

<sup>3</sup> The two way contrast is normally coded by dative/accusative as in Spanish or dative/instrumental as in Hindi. Kemmer and Verhagen (1994) document a three way contrast for Dutch where zero marked accusative (non-nominative) is in contrast with dative and instrumental. The highest degree of causer control/affectedness over the causee should be zero marked; dative would signal some degree of the causee's independence, while instrumental marking would let the participant be peripheral to the core event as s/he would be most independent.

- |    |    |   |      |
|----|----|---|------|
| 1. | a. | <i>Hij liet haar de brief lezen</i> (NON-NOMINATIVE)                          | [+E] |
|    |    | He let her the letter read<br>'He let/had her read the letter'                |      |
|    | b. | <i>Hij liet de brief aan iedereen lezen</i> (DAT)                             | [E]  |
|    |    | He let the letter to everybody read<br>'He let/had everybody read the letter' |      |
|    | c. | <i>Hij liet de brief dor iemand lezen</i> (AGENTIVE/INSTR)                    | [-E] |
|    |    | He let the letter by somebody read<br>'He had the letter read by somebody'    |      |

nominative in the indicative mood. This type of approach accounts naturally for all the problematic cases given in section II. The direct-indirect contrast in Spanish is determined by the degree of energy of the causee having the dative a [E+] configuration. It also accounts for the Kannada, Hindi, Quechua examples and the VVO, VOV gradual organization described for French by Achard<sup>4</sup>. Figures 4 to 6 show a gradual decrease of causer agentivity which gives more freedom for the causee to act.

We still need to account for the fact that the causee may be the object of the main clause. The pragmatic information involving hearer and speaker interaction provides the clue. Causation takes place now at the discourse level only. By request the hearer allows the speaker to perform some other action. Thus the speaker gets accusative marking in the main clause. The actual action is one of which the speaker is in total control. Thus the indicative form at the action level is expected. Coordination is also expected for there are two events linked by pragmatic coincidence. This explains why the causee can be overtly expressed as object and subject as in (47).

To sum up although the INDICATIVE-CAUSATIVE construction is still causative at the discourse level, it shows a high degree of independence of the caused event. This obtains as the initiative force of the causer has been drastically reduced to suspend his/her activity as requested by the speaker. The link between causal and caused event is however maintained pragmatically as the causee is equated with the speaker and the causer with the hearer. In contrast with other manifestations of dependency among events the INDICATIVE-CAUSATIVE constructions maintain the link through conversational ties. This pragmatic strategy constitutes the last and weakest possible link in the causative chain which obtains as a direct consequence of the weakening causation process that *dejar* 'let' has undergone.

The behavior described for the indicative-causative construction fully coincides with what Langacker (2000) has proposed as subjectification, a diachronical process of attenuation in degree of control exerted by an agentive subject. As attenuation takes place the notion of potency weakens and shifts from the dominion of the subject to that of the conceptualizer. Subjectification thus involves subjectivity. For instance, the attenuation involved in the diachronical evolution of *can* precisely shifts the potency of the subject to do something (60606060) to that of some other participant in the event (61) and finally to that of the conceptualizer as s/he evaluates the possibility of the event to take place (62):

60. *I can solve the problem*  
 61. *The patient can come in now*  
 62. *Things can go wrong*

---

<sup>4</sup> The VV construction is only adequate when the causer is in a higher degree of control over the causee's actions as in (a). In contrast, when the causee's control of his own actions is higher, as in (d), the VOV construction rules:

a.		<i>Jean</i> laisse partir Marie quand <u>il</u> veut	(VV)	[+E]
b.	??	<i>Jean</i> laisse Marie partir quand <u>il</u> veut	(VOV)	[+E]
c.	??	<i>Jean</i> laisse partir Marie quand <u>elle</u> veut	(VV)	[E]
d.		<i>Jean</i> laisse <u>Marie</u> partir quand <u>elle</u> veut	(VOV)	[E]

Force-dynamics determines that [+E] be linked to a VV construction, thus the marginality of (**¡Error! No se encuentra el origen de la referencia.**b and c). Other details regarding viewpoint and verbs of perception as analyzed by Achard are consistent with this analysis.

In the last stage the agentive force becomes totally transparent. Attenuation is a pervasive process in grammaticalization which shows in modals, auxiliaries, tense markers and so on. The shifting of *go* from actual motion to future marking is a most cited case. This shift is also represented in Soares's analysis of Portuguese *dexar* 'let' and this paper is in line with the Portuguese findings. Yet Mexican Spanish seems to have taken a step forward in the subjectification process. The change of *dejar* 'let' from leaving something in some place (*Dejé la carta en el buzón* 'I drop the letter in the mailbox') to allowing somebody to do something (*Dejé que me sustituyeran* 'I allowed them to take my place') there is already a first shift in attenuation as the potency is transferred from the causer to the causee. The causer's potency is further diminished as *dejar* only means not impeding someone else's action as shown in (*Juan empezó a hacer disparates y yo lo dejé hacerlos* 'John started fooling around and I let him do it'). Since the subject's force is still present there is no total transparency. Finally, the case of the INDICATIVE-CAUSATIVE construction is a further step in the direction of transparency since potency now shifts to the ground, the dominion of speaker and hearer in oral interactions. Both the Castilian and the Mexican INDICATIVE-CAUSATIVE constructions are quite transparent and yet we can still find degrees of causation having the Castilian construction less transparency than the Mexican one. The complementizer—together with the intonation change-- designates a stronger demand on the hearer by the speaker.

The last point to consider is whether the indicative-causative constructions involves subordination. The data given along this paper suggests that it does not. In true causatives constructions with *hacer* 'make', *forzar* 'force', etc. the asymmetry between the two clauses is evident. However the case of the indicative-causative construction constitutes another instance of more formulaic expressions pointed out by Thompson (2002) and Langacker (in press) where there is enough evidence against analyzing the complement clause as subordinate. Epistemic, evidential, evaluative and formulaic expressions have been identified by Thompson as clear cases where the apparent main "clause" is less prominent than the complement. The complement taking verb simply introduces the content of the second clause. The complement clause does not qualify either as an object or as a subordinated clause. Here are two typical examples where the informative clause is underlined:

63. a. *I'm convinced that it's OK*  
 b. *Let's find out if it works.*

As pointed out by Thompson, these cases do not pass Haspelmath's (1996) test of "focusability" for complements where only subordinates may be focused:

64. a. \* *What let's find out is if it works.*  
 b. \* *What I am convinced is that it is OK*

Similarly in Spanish the indicative-causative (65) the complement cannot take focus while a real complement can (66):

65. *déjame veo* 'let me see' > \* *Lo que déjame es veo* 'what let me is I see'.  
 66. *Acepté que no me quisieras* > *Lo que acepté es que no me quisieras*  
 'I accepted that you wouldn't love me' 'What I accepted is that you wouldn't love me'

Not only this syntactic argument but the whole behavior of the indicative-causative construction proves that no subordination takes place. Both clauses operate at different levels. While the *let* clause pertains to the discourse level, the complement caused clause does so at the level of the action. The Spanish causative construction is no doubt formulaic, as evidenced by all the speaker-hearer interaction restrictions put forward in section XXX. Yet unlike epistemic expressions like *Creo que va a llover* ‘I think it is going to rain’ commonly used to introduce a topic in the complement clause the indicative-causative maintains the link between speaker and hearer to put the complement clause in profile. Figure 6 above precisely represents a case where attenuation has made the causal verb totally transparent with little prominence (as represented by the dotted arrow) while the complement verb is undoubtedly the main figure. In the case of causative constructions the asymmetry found in main and complement clause represents iconically higher degrees of causative organization via subjectification as in the causative-subjunctive construction. Such asymmetry is lost to since both clauses operate at different levels such that the complement clause is no longer a caused object.

## V. Conclusions

In this paper I have proposed that causative event complexity is determined by the force-dynamic interaction established between causer and causee. The type of interaction to be found is rich and complex as it can be determined by the number of participants involved in the event, the degree of (in)dependence of the causee to perform an action, the degree of volition with which the causer impinges the causee to do something, the capacity of the causee to resist the causer’s input and the degree of separability of the two composing subevents. While periphrastic causative constructions tend to map the structure of basic transitive and transfer mental constructs, as proposed by the integration hypothesis, the representation of causal relations can be subject to more specific conceptualizations which are coded syntactically, not lexically. While the semantics of causative verb provides one degree of information for the calculus of causal strength, finer grain force-interaction is reflected by the coding properties of the construction. Based on P’orepecha I have shown that, following general principles, the degree of complexity of the event is represented by the coding properties of the language. Lexical and morphemic causatives tend to reflect direct causation while (complex) morphemic and periphrastic causatives specialize in indirect causation. Once there is some caused event independence, causer and causee may interact in a variety of ways that are coded in the construction. Case marking, complement mood choice and word order are the most common syntactic-semantic strategies with which the complexity of the event is coded. The case of the three causative Spanish constructions is coded mainly by mood choice. Subjunctive mood encodes independence decreasing the strength of the causer. Indicative provides more energetic causees with capacity to resist or diminish the causer’s commands. Crucially the lack of a complementizer signals an important degree of causee independence. The emergence of the INDICATIVE-CAUSATIVE construction may be motivated by the attenuation process of the causative verb *dejar*. While the bleaching process of *dejar* may respond to general cognitive processes associated with diminishing causal strength in verbs that already designate “suspending some interaction” (Soarez da Silva, in press) Spanish has taken a further step where *dejar* designates the minimal causal strength of keeping the hearer “connected” to the communicative line as s/he performs some other action. Pragmatic communicative needs keep triggering new conceptualization patterns and the indicative-causative construction responds precisely to those requirements.

## References.

- Achard, M. 1996. "Two causation/perception constructions in French". *Cognitive Linguistics* 7-4: 315-357.
- Achard, M. 2000. "Selección de modo en complementos oracionales" in Maldonado, Ricardo (ed.), *Estudios Cognoscitivos del español*. México: Instituto de Investigaciones Filológicas-UNAM. 153-174.
- Comrie, Bernard. 1976. The Syntax of Causative Constructions: Cross-language Similarities and Divergencies. In Shibatani, M.(ed.). *Syntax and Semantics 6: The Grammar of Causative Constructions*. New York: Academic Press. 261-312.
- Fauconnier, G and M. Turner. 1996. "Blending as a Central Process of Grammar. In Golberg, A. (ed.) *Conceptual Structure Discourse and Language*. Stanford: CSLI. 113-129.
- Fauconnier, G and M. Turner. 1998. "Conceptual Integration Networks". *Cognitive Science*. 22: 133-187.
- García Miguel, José María. In press. Syntactic and semantic integration in Spanish causative-reflexive construction. In Cornillie, Bert and Nicole Delbeque (eds.), *On interpreting Construction Schemas* Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter.
- Givon, Talmy. 1990. *Syntax: A functional typological introduction*, Vol 2. Amsterdam: John Benjamins.
- Haspelmath, Martin. 1996. "The Converb as a Cross-linguistically Valid Category". In Haspelmath, Martin and Ekkehard König (eds.), *Converbs in Crosslinguistic Perspective*. Berlin: Mouton. 1-55.
- Kemmer, Suzanne and Arie Verhagen. 1994. "The Grammar of Causatives and the Conceptual Structure of Events". *Cognitive Linguistics* 5-2: 115-156.
- Langacker, R. 1991. "Transitivity, Case and Grammatical Relations" *Concept, Image and symbol. The Cognitive Basis of Grammar*. Berlin, New York: Mouton de Gruyter. 209-260.
- Langacker, Ronald. 2000. "Subjectification and Grammaticalization". In *Grammar and conceptualization* Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter. 297-316.
- Langacker, Ronald. ms. "Subordination in Cognitive Grammar".
- Maldonado, Ricardo. 1988. "Energetic Reflexives in Spanish" *Berkeley Linguistics Society*. 14: 153-165.
- Maldonado, Ricardo. 1995. "Middle Subjunctive Links" in Hashemipour Peggy, Ricardo Maldonado, Margaret vanNaersen (eds.), *Studies in Language Learning and Spanish Linguistics in Honor of Tracy Terrell*. New York: McGraw Hill. 319-418.
- Maldonado, Ricardo. 1999. *A media voz. Problemas conceptuales del clítico se*. Mexico: Instituto de Investigaciones Filológicas, UNAM.
- Maldonado, Ricardo y Fernando. Nava 2002. "Tarascan Causatives and event complexity". In Shibatani, 2002. 157-196.
- Talmy, L. 1988. "Force Dynamics in Language and Cognition". *Cognitive Science* 12: 49-100.
- Thompson, Sandra. 2002. "Object Complements and Conversation Towards a Realistic Account. *Studies in Language* 26.1: 125-164.
- Shibatani, Masayoshi. 2002. "Introduction: Some Basic Issues in the Grammar of Causation". In Shibatani, Masayoshi (ed.), *The Grammar of Causation and Interpersonal Manipulation*. Amsterdam: John Benjamins. 1-22.

- Soares da Silva, Augusto. 1999. *A Semântica de Deixar. Uma Contribuição para a Abordagem Cognitiva em Semântica Lexical*. Fundação Calouste Gulbenkian. Braga.
- Soares da Silva, Augusto. 2003. Image schemas and category coherence: The case of the Portuguese verb *deixar*. In: Hubert Cuyckens, René Dirven & John Taylor (eds.), *Cognitive Approaches to Lexical Semantics*, Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter, 281-322.
- Vázquez Verónica. 2002. "Some Constraints in Causative Constructions in Cora". In Shibatani, Masayoshi (ed). 2002. 197-244.